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Why should we respect the wishes which individuals may have about how their 
body is treated after death? Reflecting on how and why the law respects the bodies 
of the living, we argue that we must also respect the ‘dead’. We contest the 
relevance of the argument ‘the dead have no interests’, rather we think that the 
pertinent argument is ‘the living have interests in what happens to their dead 
bodies’. And, we advance arguments why we should also respect the wishes of the 
relatives of the deceased regarding what happens to the bodies of their loved ones. 
In our analysis, we use objections to organ and tissue donation for conscientious 
reasons (often presented as religious reasons) to show why the living can have 
interests in their dead bodies, and those of their dead relatives, and why these 




One day, sooner or later, our bodies will be burned, or eaten by worms. Given that 
inevitable fate, how can it be argued that the individual during her life, or her 
family after her death, have interests in what happens to the corpse prior to its 
‘decent disposal’? If a liver from a corpse will save someone else’s life, if retaining 
the heart will enable cardiac surgeons to refine their surgical skills, why should any 
impediment stand in the way? How can the ‘dead’ command respect? John Harris 
puts his case forcefully: 
 
…the complaints of those who object to actions that violate the physical integrity 
of the corpse are scarcely rational. Illusions are fine, but whether the State and the 
Courts should give judicial or official support to these illusions is more doubtful, 
particularly when to do so might deprive others of life saving therapies.1 
 
We beg to disagree. We contend that laws should acknowledge that some of the 
same considerations which require us to respect the bodily integrity of the living 
also demand that we respect the wishes of the individual about what happens to her 
corpse. Nor should we ride roughshod over the interests of bereaved relatives. 
Objections to organ donation and/or to removal of tissue for education or research 
should not be dismissed as irrelevant because the dead have no interests. They are 
not irrelevant. And attempts to dismiss ‘the dead’ as of no importance may 
backfire, however laudable the motives of those who seek to increase the supply of 
organs and tissue for transplantation, education or research. We argue that the 
values held by the deceased in life (and in particular religious and conscientious 
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values) cannot simply be discounted to justify removing his organs without consent 
after his death. Nor in some instances can those same values adhered to by 
bereaved families be dismissed as of no account. 
 
WHY BODIES MATTER 
Passionate concern about the fate of the body has a lengthy history. In 1834, the 
playwright, William Cobbett attacked two new Acts of Parliament – the dreaded 
Poor Law of 1834 and the Anatomy Act of 1832. 
 
I’d rather die than see her begging a morsel of bread from the flint-hearted 
overseer…hear of her dying perhaps and of her body being cut to pieces like the 
carcass of a dead horse at the dog kennel.2 
 
In 2008, were the benefit system to be re-organised to consign all citizens unable to 
support themselves to the workhouse, where they would be forcibly separated from 
their families, fed minimal rations and forced to work until they dropped, we would 
all agree that such inhumane treatment fails to respect the living. Our nineteenth 
century ancestors rightly feared the workhouse. Yet as Ruth Richardson has 
elegantly demonstrated, they feared the anatomy school more.3 However, even in 
1834, workhouse masters could not literally ‘sell’ inmates’ bodies for dog meat. 
Unclaimed pauper bodies were made available to the anatomy schools to train 
medical students in dissection. Dissection offered an understanding of the human 
body that helped develop scientific medicine. Raymond Tallis says that:  
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Of all the clinical disciplines, pathology is the one which most directly reflects the 
demystification of the human body that has made scientific medicine so effective 
and humane.4 
 
So why in the nineteenth century and twentieth century did pathology become 
demonised? Why did revelations that pathologists had retained organs and tissue 
for medical research and training create such controversy?5 Why do so many 
bereaved families still refuse consent to organ donation?6 Whatever use is made of 
a dead body or tissue excised from the living, no-one suffers physical pain or 
injury. No person appears to be harmed. We want to explore the notion of respect 
for bodies, beginning with the living before moving to the dead. 
 
TISSUE FROM THE LIVING 
The law assigns a high value to bodily integrity. Touch me, and you trespass on my 
person. Intrude on a living body without due authorisation and you violate Article 8 
of the European Convention on Human Rights.7 So it seems heretical even to ask 
why our bodily integrity should be respected? We may claim respect by virtue of 
our virtues, if any. But what are the claims of our bodies? Imagine that deep in our 
DNA is buried information crucial to the health of our families, or even the 
community at large.8 As we sleep, someone (a researcher) gently scrapes away a 
skin cell and thus our miraculous DNA becomes accessible. We feel no pain. We 
will not notice the loss of one flake of skin. Yet an assault has occurred, and 
section 45 of the Human Tissue Act 2004 is violated.9 The law condemns the 
disrespect, but what harm has been done? One obvious answer is that our 
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autonomy has been violated. We have been robbed of the choice about helping our 
families, or helping medicine. But perhaps the ‘thief’ knows what uncharitable 
individuals we are and that we would have said no. Whatever the good motives, 
does that exacerbate the offence? What if he simply finds the cell shed on a scarf 
that we have borrowed? Still he commits an offence. He has no claim to presume 
our consent. He still violates section 45 of the 2004 Act, even if in strict law he 
may not be a ‘thief’.10 
  
Bodily material has several values. The origins of the common law’s 
absolutist stance to bodily integrity probably lies in the difficulty of drawing a line 
elsewhere than condemning the ‘least touching of another’.11 If someone can 
scrape a single skin cell, why could they not garner a slide full of skin cells? 
Today, any bodily material has other more quantifiable values. We may be content 
for our hairdresser to chuck away our shorn locks, but would not want agents of 
our insurers, or employers, or the state collecting them for analysis. Imagine our 
DNA has commercial value. We might be content to give it away, but might feel 
very different about someone selling it to the Medical School, or the Medical 
School selling it on to a biotechnology company.12 We could elaborate, but do we 
have to? Few people would dissent from the view that  no-one should interfere with 
our living bodies without our consent, regardless of whether the ‘victim’ suffers 
any hurt or tangible harm.13  
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Does agreeing to surgery alter the picture? The Nuffield Council Report on Human 
Tissue in 1995 suggested that, in agreeing to surgery, the patient abandoned any 
interest in excised tissue.14 Mason and Laurie comment that:  
 
To assert …that patients be deemed to abandon their tissue is to ignore the 
potential value which those very patients may well hold in retaining control over 
that material.15 
 
If we have a cyst from an eyelid excised, it is a fair bet we will not have a strong 
interest in its fate.16 Some patients however, may be concerned to safeguard their 
genetic privacy. And what if viable ovaries are removed? Could you assume that 
the woman was content to allow any ripe ova to be used in IVF, or allow her 
ovaries to be used in research? A devout Sikh might retain an interest in even the 
smallest scrap of bodily material. Orthodox Jews seek means to store amputated 
limbs to be buried with them when they die. A small boy might simply want his 
appendix back to keep in a jar and exhibit to his friends. A host of reasons may 
describe why a particular individual may ascribe value to bodily material from the 
living which most people might dismiss as ludicrous. Different kinds of 
explanations are advanced to justify why we should respect individuals’ claims to 
rights over ‘their’ bodily material, be it attached or detached from the body. 
Privacy, bodily integrity, dignity, property are all given their day in court.17 No 
theory fully explains a claim to control over all bodily material. Mason and Laurie 
come closest in suggesting a harm that ‘…can include the ‘harm’ of disrespect for 
the dignity of the human organism’.18 Whatever its source, some kind of claim to 
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control of our bodily material while still living is endorsed in law. There is no 
balancing exercise. Weighing respect for the ‘human organism’ against the good 
our bodily material could do for others is not even essayed. We cannot be required 
to donate blood (trivial though any ‘cost’ to us may be). Nor may excess blood 
taken from us for therapeutic purposes be given to others without our consent even 
if our blood might save their lives.  
 
In translating principle into practice, English law acknowledges that many 
people have little concern about the use of excised bodily material. And so the 
Human Tissue Act 2004 adopts a compromise.19 Consent to retention of ‘material’ 
lawfully removed in the course of surgery is presumed for purposes of audit, 
medical education or public health surveillance. Explicit appropriate consent is 
always required for transplantation. Explicit appropriate consent will usually be 
required for research unless the study is approved by a Research Ethics Committee 
and the material is anonymised.20 
 
TISSUE FROM THE DEAD 
Whatever the reasons advanced for respecting the bodily integrity of the living, and 
bodily material from the living, the dead are another species, some would say, or 
no species at all, hence Harris’s objections that actions that violate the physical 
integrity of the corpse are ‘scarcely rational’. ‘Illusions’ cannot be allowed to 
‘deprive others [living people] of life saving therapies’.21  
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The tendentious nature of Harris’s language is evidenced in his description of all 
beliefs that endorse respecting the corpse as illusions. This is a statement that 
ignores much of the history and culture of the society in which we live. If this is a 
description that is particularly aimed at religious beliefs then it is certainly far from 
being proved.22 Illusions are beliefs that are objectively false - Harris’s rejection of 
the basis of these types of belief is not something that applies to those who hold 
them. He can not show that they are objectively false. However carefully Harris 
argues his case, ultimately he can only assert it. He is unlikely to convince those 
whose beliefs he rejects, as Thompson explains: 
 
As Mill said, in order to know that the premises are true one has already to know 
that the conclusion is true- so if I am in doubt about the conclusion, and want to be 
given a reason for accepting it, it will do no good to offer me what I must regard as 
at least as doubtful as the conclusion.23 
 
For those who hold the beliefs that Harris rejects as irrational, it is perfectly 
reasonable to want the body to remain intact for the afterlife. Religious beliefs form 
an internally coherent belief system. However even if we accept what Harris says, 
it is unclear whether we should live in a society that will not indulge ‘illusions’ of 
this type. We tend to agree with the argument of Bernard Williams: 
 
…at the limit, the argument will be heard that coercive force can be justified to 
prevent the formation of inappropriate desires or to encourage the formation of 
appropriate ones, so that people, as Rousseau put it, can be forced to be free.24 
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Freedom of conscience and freedom of religion are considered important features 
of most liberal democracies. They are important because they allow us to be the 
authors of our own lives, a point which we will later address more fully. If we want 
to take steps to curtail individual freedoms, we must move cautiously, even if we 
believe that the overall benefit will be large. There are certain types of beliefs that 
can be shown to be true or false objectively. There are other types of belief of 
which we can be less sure. When these beliefs are the strongly held conscientious 
beliefs of an individual then liberalism demands that we should let them live as 
they choose, we should respect their beliefs .25  
 
Objections to the use of corpses are often said to derive from religion. We address 
these later. We consider some other objections first.  
 
In the wake of almost unprecedented public controversy generated by revelations 
that organs and tissue had routinely been retained by pathologists (without consent) 
after the completion of post-mortem examinations, the Department of Health set up 
the NHS Retained Organs Commission chaired by the second named author.26 In 
the course of over three years, the Commission met thousands of relatives deeply 
aggrieved by their discovery that they had buried or cremated only part of their 
relative’s body. The heart or the brain was missing. In some rarer cases virtually all 
internal organs had been removed and retained.27 Yet very few families stated that 
in no circumstances would they have consented to retention of their relative’s 
organs – other than those who objected on grounds of religion.28 A number had 
 10 
asked if their relatives’ organs could be donated for transplant purposes. The 
Redfern Report says of one such case. 
 
Until recently both parents had carried organ donor cards for many years. They 
would have donated their daughters’ organs to another child. They would have 
considered the organs being used for research if they were asked but they were 
never asked. The right to decide the fate of their daughter’s organs was taken away 
from them.29  
 
What many families objected to was covert conscription, and what they saw as an 
abuse of both their dead relative and themselves. Those who dismiss any objection 
to retention and beneficial use of bodily material might then advance two 
arguments:  
 
• The majority were simply complaining of a breach of etiquette.  
 
• The minority of absolute objectors should be overruled in the public 
interest.  
 
We reject both arguments. The first fails because it fails to recognise that death of 
the body is not the end of the biographical person. When a parent dies, in the 
context of a bereavement we must all expect to face, we do not cease to regard her 
as mother. We do not in common parlance now speak of ‘the deceased’ – or ‘the 
corpse’ or ‘the ashes’. While she no longer enjoys the attributes of personhood, she 
 11 
remains a person in the minds of those attached to her. Reflect on this telling 
paragraph in the Bristol Interim Report: 
 
For the parents of a deceased child, human material, certainly substantial 
specimens such as organs and parts of organs, and even smaller parts are still 
thought about as an integral part of the child’s body and thus are still the child. For 
the pathologists and clinicians the material is regarded as a specimen or object. It 
is dehumanised.30 
 
The focus on retention of children’s organs by the media obscured the evidence 
that organs were retained from people of all ages, to the anger of some families 
who resented the apparently exclusive focus on children.31 Nonetheless, the 
especial anger generated by organ retention involving children should engage us 
here for a moment. In some cases, the baby was only a few days or a few weeks 
old or even stillborn. The death of a child before her parents is a reversal of the 
natural order, even when the child is 30 and the parents are in their sixties. The 
death of a baby has become so rare that for most of us it is unimaginable. When an 
adult or an older child dies, the family share a set of memories of what that person 
did and said. The physical memory remains, but is supplemented by other kinds of 
recollection. With the baby or small child, that physical memory may be all that 
there is. The body is the baby. And for many years the parents’ relationship with 
the child is bound up in contact, touch, cuddles and washing and dressing the child. 
In his address to the congregation at the memorial service for children whose 
organs were retained at Alder Hey Hospital, the Bishop of Liverpool spoke 
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eloquently of the human importance of contact.32 Death removes the possibility of 
that warm connection ever again. Sudden, untimely death, often leaves the 
survivors with feelings of guilt. Revering the body is the final service you can 
render your child, wife or father. Revering the body may take many forms. 
Donation of organs and tissue may be one such form. But the person whose body 
now lies in the mortuary is still (whatever the law or philosophers or anyone else 
may say) perceived as yours, not material to be harvested by others. That does not 
mean that families should always be perceived as likely to adopt a negative attitude 
to requests to retain parts of the deceased’s body for transplant or other purposes. 
The central claim is that the body of the dead child (or adult) and the family’s 
interest in the final disposition of that body should be respected.33 The Redfern 
Inquiry concluded: 
 
On the evidence we feel that many more parents would be willing to consider 
consenting to their children’s organs or tissue being retained for the purposes of 
medical education and research, if the matter were dealt with more openly and 
respectfully.34 
  
Individuals themselves may be as concerned with the treatment of their 
body after death as they are in life. They may decide that they want certain things 
to be carried out after they die, and they may wish for their bodies to be treated in a 
certain way. They may have a preference for whole body burial over cremation. 
Their reasons may be based on religious beliefs, cultural practices, other 
conscientious beliefs, or even have no basis. They may be content to donate all 
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their organs, or just some of their organs.35 They may be adamantly opposed to any 
‘interference’ with their corpse. How best should we respect these wishes in death? 
Should we respect them at all?  
 
DEATH – OF PERSONS AND TRANSITION 
Those who argue that the dead (and their bereaved families) have no interests fail 
to reflect on the nature of death. Death is not akin to a switch that once “off” means 
that the dead person ceases to matter at all. Death is described by some as, and can 
traditionally be seen to be, a socially constructed event.36 Death rituals have formed 
an important part of the grieving process. Throughout history there has been an 
expectation that in death the body will be respected as a symbol of the living 
person.37 Death of someone close to you is difficult to accept. We struggle to adjust 
to an understanding that the person is gone. Identifying with the dead is so hard 
that we think of the dead body as a symbol of the pre-mortem person.38 
 
The dead infant, the wife succumbing to breast cancer at 35, the elderly father 
dying suddenly of a heart attack, do not change their nature for their mother, 
husband or daughter. They remain Susannah, Lucy and Dad.39  
 
They are not simply things. How families lets go of  their lost relatives differs.  
 
In the hyper-medicalized West, death, like many other life events, has become a 
medical event, more so when it takes place in a busy hospital setting. Death is 
feared and medically heroic efforts may be taken in order to avoid it. Thus the use 
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of the bodies of the recently dead, through organ or tissue donation, represents a 
point of collision between life and death.40 The lives of some become reliant on the 
death of others. This practical reality is often conflated with the view that the 
interests of the living must thus be pitted against the no longer existent interests of 
the deceased.41 Simply phrasing such a conflict in this manner immediately tips the 
balance towards the living. We contend that this is too simplistic an approach.  
 
RELIGION IN THE BALANCE? 
One commonly cited objection to organ donation, or any other retention of bodily 
material from the dead, is religion. Consent to organ donation is refused because 
the family members argue that their faith requires burial or cremation of an intact 
body. As we shall see, there is little evidence that any of the major world religions 
holds an absolute objection to organ donation although there may be objection to 
other forms of interference with the corpse, and/or restrictions on the manner and 
form of donation. Faith based objections are much discussed perhaps because such 
objections are sometimes seen as at least ‘reasoned’ if not endorsed as rational. 
Other objections such as ‘I can’t bear to think of my baby without her heart’ – or- 
‘we can’t stomach the thought of removing mum’s eyes’ may seem to carry less 
weight. So, although it may at times appear that we place too much emphasis on 
religious beliefs, we discuss them here to illustrate a strong category of 
conscientious objection and to begin to show how it is important to respect 
individual beliefs, even if to many they seem objectively irrational. Conscientious 
beliefs and practices have been described by Ellis as: 
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… beliefs and practices, which are not merely important to people, but important 
because, in light of their content, they are regarded as somehow demanded of 
them. This would extend to moral, political and, perhaps, some aesthetic beliefs as 
well as religious ones.42  
 
Beliefs have a normative force. They compel us to act in certain ways. We can 
know certain things without believing them. Knowledge, in some ways, has a less 
motivating nature than belief. For individuals who hold certain beliefs, there is no 
choice in how to act. There is only one course of action available to them. Simply 
to tell these people that they are wrong is not enough, and it is arguable that it is 
also not appropriate. Therefore when we consider how conscientious beliefs are 
manifested another point that we should be aware of is that, for the individual who 
holds the beliefs, having to give those beliefs up, modify them in certain ways, or 
lose the freedom to exercise them may have very serious effects. Again we refer to 
Ellis: 
 
For some purposes, conscientious beliefs and the practices that go with them may 
properly be regarded simply as preferences. But they are special preferences 
because of the sort of constraint they place on those who have them. It is not 
simply difficult for such people to abandon them, as it may be difficult for a 
pigeon-fancier to give up his hobby. The sacrifice involved is of quite a different 




Ellis’s definition poses two immediate challenges for us. (1) Must such a 
conscientious belief or practice command ‘official’ sanction from faith leaders? (2) 
Can such a ‘belief’ outweigh the quantifiable harm that is suffered if a patient dies 
for want of an organ, or medical advance is impeded by shortage of tissue for 
research or teaching?  
 
RELIGIOUS MYTH, NOT REALITY? 
A conference convened by UK Transplant and the Church of England Hospital 
Chaplaincy Council in 2003 established that in Judaism, Buddhism, Islam, Sikhism 
and most Christian denominations, there is no settled and uniform objection to 
organ donation per se.44 Judaism and Islam emphasise the importance of treating 
the dead body with dignity and that the norm should be to bury the entire body as 
swiftly as possible. Jewish scholars disagree on whether the imperative to save a 
life via organ donation may derogate from usual religious duties relating to the 
bodies of the dead. Lamm declares that one ‘…may not do violence to the human 
form even when the breath of life has expired’.45 The former Chief Rabbi, 
Immanuel Jacobovitz disagreed.46 Sinclair notes: 
 
…two recommendations for bridging the gap between halakah and the modern 
policy of encouraging organ donation are the adoption of a personal-choice 
approach (limited autonomy) to live organ donations…and the adoption of the 
direct and immediate life-saving justification for cadaver donations to the realities 
of modern medicine. 47 
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He warns, however, that we should not ‘…lose sight of the moral imperative to 
treat dead bodies with dignity’.48 Muslim doctors, Sheikh and Gatrad, cite the 
Islamic doctrine ‘necessity permits the prohibited’.49 Organ donation is thus in their 
view not outlawed in Islam. Within Christianity, most major denominations 
endorse organ donation as a religious ‘good’; a sacrifice conforming to Christian 
ideals. Only some numerically small groups such as the Brethren prohibit cadaver 
donation.50 Nonetheless, in Judaism, Islam and Christianity many individual 
believers and local ministers and community leaders disagree. ‘A substantial 
number of the faithful remain profoundly unconvinced’.51 In particular, beliefs 
about bodily resurrection and the imperative not to violate the body created in the 
image of their Creator result in numerous individuals believing that their faith 
prohibits donation.52 Randhawa quotes one of those interviewed to elicit their 
views on organ donation. 
 
‘I’m not sure about life after death, but if there is life I want to go complete.’53 
 
How much weight (if any) should we give to individuals whose beliefs are at odds 
with the official line in their professed faith? Is it relevant that religious leaders do 
not appear to demand such beliefs? Does evidence that a belief is derived from 
individual conscience rather than settled doctrine dilute the force that should be 
attached to that belief? Religion is no longer authoritative in the sense that it was 
fifty years ago. The influence of the Christian church is in decline; it is no longer 
the moral authority it once was; it is increasingly diluted through individual 
conscience. As we have seen Sinclair endorses personal choice in Judaism.54 
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Personal choice works both ways – to allow the individual to choose to donate 
against the mainstream of religious doctrine and to allow the individual to elect to 
prioritise the older tradition of entirety of the body. Conscientious beliefs based in 
religious ideologies are not necessarily embedded through official doctrinal 
teaching. As Morgan & Lawton describe, religion and culture are inextricably 
intertwined and religious traditions of the past shape present cultural practices: 
 
The attitudes of single religions, such as Christianity in the U.K or Islam in Saudi 
Arabia, have sometimes permeated whole societies and influenced their laws on 
financial assistance and health care for those in need, and their attitudes to abortion 
and euthanasia.55 
 
It is religion, embedded in culture, that has had a profound effect on attitudes to 
how we treat our dead. The believer perceives what happens to the corpse as of 
equal weight to what she does with her living body. The knowledge of what may 
be done to the body when we die may affect us during life. We may be more 
acutely affected if we believe that we need our bodies for some journey we make 
after this life. Within the Romany community the burial of the body intact and 
ritual surrounding death are of great importance. Romany objections to organ 
donation are not exclusively founded on religion but derive from cultural tradition 
about the journey to an after life.56 Such a tradition will be perceived as irrational 
to those who deny any interests to the dead. It is also worth considering how a 
policy which overrules the choices of already marginalised groups within society 
may affect these groups and lead to them being further marginalised. Neither of us 
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sees the notion of bodily resurrection as rational. Does this matter? We suggest not. 
Leiter asks: 
 
Why does it promote human well being to protect liberty of conscience? Many of 
the arguments trade, at bottom, on a simple idea: namely, that being able to choose 
what to believe and how to live … makes life better. Being told what you must 
believe and how you must live, conversely, makes life worse.57 
 
BELIEF VS REASON? 
Biomedical jurisprudence offers many examples of dilemmas where an individual 
seeks to prioritise what she perceives as eternal life over the prolonged existence of 
the physical body. Jehovah’s Witnesses will refuse blood, not wishing for death, 
but accepting divine ordinance. And the law will respect the wishes of the adult 
Witness regardless of any more general view that the basis for refusing blood is 
wholly irrational, or, in the judgment of other believers, based on a 
misinterpretation of scripture.58 In prioritising ‘life after death’, Witnesses are not 
alone. For many people with religious views (orthodox or unorthodox) life and 
death remain deeply rooted in theology; they see life and death not in medical or 
legal terms, but as intrinsically religious events. Extra-temporal consequences are 
features of many religions. To live according to God’s will, the believer needs to 
trust that in death his body will be treated as God requires even though, in many 
cases, the individual believer’s perception of God’s will is not mandated by any 
official dogma prohibiting organ or tissue donation. And there are numbers of 
people with no belief in a god or an afterlife who equally strongly oppose any 
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interference in the dead body.59 Elaborate rituals bring comfort. Daily or weekly 
visits to a child’s grave – a grave decorated with toys and items dear to the child in 
life are common. People plan their funerals with meticulous care. Yet none of the 
loving care lavished on these physical remains will do any good to the deceased.  
 
By respecting the wishes of those who refuse to allow bodily material from 
the dead to be used for the benefit of others do we succumb to irrationality? We 
(happily) do so with the living. Not a drop of blood may be taken from us, however 
great the benefits to another might be. We allow the Jehovah’s Witness, a widowed 
mother of seven children, to die refusing a blood transfusion, respecting her belief, 
not because we are indifferent to the harm to her children or the cost to society, but 
because of the greater value of allowing her to be the author of her own life and 
death.60 But some may claim that these sorts of views are irrational and should not 
be indulged lest they are encouraged.  
 
This leads us to the question of why it is that we should protect freedom of 
conscience if this involves us having to protect irrational or unsuitable beliefs? 
Who is to say which beliefs are suitable and which are not? Why should we indulge 
people’s ‘illusions’? Where should we draw the line between allowing people to 
hold certain beliefs and allowing them to act in ways which manifest these beliefs? 
In what ways should we be allowed to shape our lives? Freedom of religion and 
freedom of conscience are common features of most societies. These freedoms are 
protected by Human Rights law.  
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Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations 
as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.61 
 
But what these particular freedoms involve is not clear. Does freedom of religion 
involve simply the freedom to believe in any god(s) or none at all? Or does it 
involve something more, the freedom to practise openly and in public one’s chosen 
religion? Can refusal to donate organs be seen as a manifestation of religious 
beliefs?. In Hoffmann v. Austria it seems to be accepted that refusal of blood is a 
legitimate manifestation of the beliefs of a Jehovah’s Witness.62 Whether refusal to 
donate organs would be granted the same respect is unclear. Refusal of blood is a 
central tenet of the Jehovah’s Witness faith. As we have seen, an absolute 
prohibition against organ donation is not a doctrinal obligation within any major 
faith. Yet it is devoutly held by many of the faithful as a core matter of individual 
belief. Consider Robbin's argument: 
 
For a state to concede individual freedom of beliefs (which is essentially an intra 
psychic modality) is really to concede very little. How would a government 
prevent a citizen from holding an inappropriate belief? ... Oliver Cromwell 
prohibited the catholic mass, but in doing so denied that he was infringing 
freedom of conscience.63 
 
If it is accepted, that by making decisions for ourselves, we exhibit self-rule and in 
doing so become the authors of our own lives, then should this not involve a 
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subjective account of the good? Or is freedom of conscience simply the freedom to 
live one’s life according to some objective standard of what constitutes the good? 
What should be tolerated in society? - at what cost comes freedom? Most people 
accept that there are certain acceptable limits to what we can permissibly do in 
society. For instance, if we believed that our lives will be made better by killing all 
blonde haired people, most would accept that toleration does not demand that this 
should be allowed. Alternatively, if we think our lives will be made better by dying 
our hair blonde, most will accept that we should be allowed to die our hair blonde. 
What is at issue here is harm - harms to others and harms to ourselves.  
 
However, these examples both sit at the extremes. Respect for the dead, or, more 
accurately, respect for concerns about what happens to our bodies when we are 
dead, is a less clear case.64 Thus far we have sought to show that what will happen 
to us in death affects us in life. We wished to re-focus the question from not simply 
what interests can the dead have to what interests can the living have in what 
happens to them when they are dead?65 But what limits should we place on these 
interests? How we define which interests should demand our respect and which 
should not is a vexed question, but its difficulty should not lead us to ignore it. In 
assessing the quality of someone’s life, it is one thing to say that ‘quality’ is the 
sort of thing that we cannot know or articulate, and another to say that, because we 
cannot know or articulate it, it will count for nothing. We face similar difficulties 
when trying to assess which interests that contribute to this ‘quality’ should be 
protected or indulged. Acknowledging that we cannot know these interests need 
not bring us to the conclusion that we should ignore them or leave them out. If we 
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do take this approach then what we are saying is that our inability objectively to 
know or assess what is important to you means we will not count it at all. In doing 
this we commit an error, rather like that pointed out by Parfit in ‘Innumerate 
Ethics’: in this assessment we are not granting everyone’s interests the same value, 
rather we are granting some no value at all.66  
 
In our present case, where it is the interests of those in need of an organ and those 
who do not wish for organs to be donated, what this amounts to is saying that units 
of time must win out. That if all we can objectively know are these units of time 
(the years gained by the individual who receives the organ) which are to be 
assessed against the unquantifiable harms caused to the individual who does not 
wish to donate the organ, then these units are all we can take into account. It is a 
form of poor egalitarian levelling down; we cannot know what these interests are 
so we can only make crude assessments using some kind of vitalist reasoning. It is 
one thing to say ‘that we can not know what you care about’ and another to say 
‘we don’t believe what you care about is legitimate’- what we must try to figure 
out is how to deal with this grey area.  
 
We must also consider whether this is the sort of balancing exercise that we even 
want to enter into. There are some choices we may be reasonable in not wanting to 
make and which it is reasonable not to force others to make. Consider Ellis’s 
earlier point that there are some beliefs which are so important ‘it is reasonable to 
wish [they] were immune from normal process of weighing interests.’67 Also, is 
this simply a question of redistribution?  
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It is enough to consider different possible states of affairs, or outcomes, each 
involving the same set of people. We imagine that we know how well off, in these 
outcomes, these people would be. We then ask whether either outcome would be 
better, or would be the outcome that we ought to bring about. This subject we call 
the ethics of distribution.68 
 
This passage highlights the fact that this is a discussion that presumes that organs 
are goods to be redistributed.69 It is also a discussion that presumes that those in 
need of an organ are more worthy than those who do not want to donate it. By this 
we mean that there is a presumption that the entitlement lies with those who have 
a physiological need for the organ and it is up to those who do not wish to give it 
to give (good) reason why. We often ignore the fact that neither of these premises 
is necessarily certain.  
 
It is sometimes argued that it would be rational to choose to live in a world 
where there was less of a shortage of organs - this is undoubtedly true, if overall 
that world were a better place.70 However, what we are willing to sacrifice for this 
society is less clear. On reflection, it may be more rational to choose to live in a 
society where you have more chance of dying of organ failure, but more chance of 
being allowed to live your life in accordance with the views you hold to be most 
important. Or, to put it another way, we may choose to live in a world where we 
are more likely to die for lack of an organ, but where we have more opportunities 




Equal liberty of conscience is the only principle that the persons in the original 
position can acknowledge. They cannot take chances with liberty by permitting the 
dominant religious or moral doctrine to persecute or suppress others if it wishes.71 
 
In this situation, we are not making a judgment about which type of life is more 
valuable, rather we are considering the relative importance of two valuable 
worldviews. Desire to live in a world in which you have a greater access to certain 
types of healthcare, or a world in which you have greater capacity for freedom of 
conscience.  
 
Some argue that the individual who will die is always going to be worse off. It is 
not clear whether this is always true. If we believe that removal of parts of our 
bodies will affect our chances of living extra-temporally, then we could assert that 
we are worse off. Indeed there seems to be strange cruelty in being born at all if 
this results in living a life where you believe you will be eternally damned. And 
for others who do not believe in extra-temporal consequences, but rather purely 
the distress which will be caused to them by their organs being donated - do we 
wish to set the threshold at life worth living? In order to justify why their wishes 
should be respected do they have to show that, by not respecting them, we make 




In attempting to weigh the interests of the dead we once again resort to an easy 
case. There may be good reasons to object to using the bodies of the dead to make 
dog meat. The benefits of such an activity will not usually be seen to outweigh the 
harmful effects. The upset at the prospect of dead bodies being fed to dogs is 
stronger than the benefits of a plentiful supply of cheap dog food. The distress that 
would be caused to families and friends is likely to be seen as sufficient reason to 
object to a practice such as this. Organ and tissue donation are wholly different 
matters. There is a shortage of organs in this country. The suffering caused to 
individuals who will die for want of an organ is great. Many lives would possibly 
be saved if we had more organs. Many lives would possibly be saved if we could 
use post mortem tissue more readily in research. So would conscription of dead 
bodies for scientific research and organ donation be justified in a democratic 
society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order? Does 
prolonging life trump all other interests? Remember that we do not have an 
absolutist policy that encourages donation at all cost. We do not, for example, 
allow directed donation or the sale of organs; we have certain procedures in place 
to regulate the system of donation. Pennings suggests that this is a reflection of the 
fact that we do not believe that increased donation is a principle to be protected 
above everything else: 
 
A person states a condition that conflicts with the procedures. By doing so, he or 
she renders the organs unfit for donation. As a consequence, the candidate donor, 
and not the transplant centre, is responsible for the waste of the organs… … 
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The cases presented above demonstrate that society does not want to maximize 
organs for transplantation at all costs; it wants to retrieve as many organs as 
possible within a procedure that fulfils a set of normative ethical rules.72 
 
But must this all be placed in such oppositional terms one may ask? Must the 
interests of one group always be pitted against those of another? It could be 
argued that what is important here is respect in how we treat others. As has been 
mentioned, there are few religious groups who actively encourage their members 
not to donate their organs. The matter here is one of individual conscience and the 
fact that we are sometimes unclear about what this means does not mean we can 
just ignore it. An individual may have good reason to believe that she is justified 
in not allowing her tissue to be used for research, even if this means someone else 
may die. Similarly, individuals may have good reason to believe that their organs 
should not be removed from their bodies after their deaths.  
 
BENEFITING THE DEAD AND THE LIVING 
We have sought to show that at the least the dead are owed some degree of respect. 
If dead bodies were truly of no more account than say vegetables there would be 
no objection even to their use as dog meat. We have emphasised the value of 
choice, a value that studies of organ and tissue donation practice have endorsed. 
For many people the choice of whether to permit any or some use of their dead 
body, or the body of their relative, is crucially affected by how that choice is 
offered and what form that choice should take. Organ and tissue donation should 
not be seen as an all or nothing affair. So, for example, Muslim families with 
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concerns about the need to bury the entire body swiftly may be content to donate 
organs to promote the necessity of saving a life but not to donate a whole body to a 
medical school. Pragmatically the process by which the issues of organ and tissue 
donation are raised will be more important than legislative steps which over-rule 
choice.73 Sheikh & Gatrad explain: 
  
At a practical level we suggest that discussions concerning organ transplantation 
are initiated by the transplant team…allowing these concerns to be addressed 
accurately and sensitively. Such liaison workers may also have a key role to play 
in the aftermath of organ donation or transplant, exploring and allaying feelings of 
guilt that may ensue.74 
 
Sque et al have argued that more research needs to be carried out directly regarding 
tissue retention.75 While much work has been done to determine the views an 
individual may have regarding organ donation, less has been done in the area of 
tissue use. It is suggested that the ability to interchange human organs and tissue 
introduces a relatively unexplored dimension to grieving that requires specific 
attention.76 
 
The views of the family should be given serious consideration given the important 
role the body may have in the grieving process. We have mentioned how for the 
family the deceased remains a ‘person’ - this is so even when according to some 
accounts that ‘Person’ may no longer be there in any real sense.77 
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Parents contrasted the very full information they received about the treatment of 
their children in life with the absence of information in death.78 
 
We should not presume that families will be against donation. The procedures that 
surround the manner in which the question of donation is raised will be all 
important. Pushing methods that over-rule or ignore people will not necessarily 
help to increase organ donation. As opposed to trying to deal with how individuals 
feel at the ‘moment of the decision’, methods like this ignore the issue, thus 
creating a system where the burden on the family of the deceased is increased. It 
can appear at times that there is much ‘propaganda’ in favour of organ donation. 
This could lead to individuals feeling guilty if they do not donate when it is simply 
a choice that not everyone can make. The social and cultural nature of death and 
death rituals is deeply ingrained. While it may be legitimate to claim that many of 
the beliefs surrounding the body in death, and the rituals we carry out in death, 
amount to little more than superstition, this does not change the fact that these 
‘superstitions’ are pervasive. Changing the law surrounding donation so that it may 
in turn change these beliefs is a little naïve at best and at worst will make martyrs 
of many whose beliefs will not be changed. 
 
A liberal democracy will wish to foster on the part of its citizens a serious 
reflective attitude to important matters of principle. It can hardly do this and at the 
same time accept that commitments reached in the light of such reflection may be 
submerged at any time in the calculus of interests on which decisions about the 




In this article, we hoped to show that when we commit to respecting the interests of 
the living we are also committing to respecting the dead. The concerns we may 
have with what is done with our bodies after death should not simply be dismissed 
as irrational. And, if they are, we have shown why concepts such as rational and 
irrational are to some extent fluid and can vary according to each individual’s 
perspective. To demand rationality in death is to some extent to misunderstand the 
nature of the processes involved, and at times places too much of a burden on those 
who should not have to bear it. Furthermore, proving the rationality/ irrationality of 
fundamental beliefs will not necessarily be something that is objectively possible. 
Difficulties in defining what it is we mean when we speak about ‘conscientious’ or 
‘important’ beliefs can not lead us to the conclusion that these difficulties can be 
overcome by ignoring them. It will be a disservice to the ends we may wish to 
promote to try and pursue arguments like this. We must to a certain extent ‘keep 
our eye on the prize’. The reason why we want to increase organ donation is to 
allow more people to enjoy their lives for longer. We should be wary of steps we 
take which may overall have a converse effect; those steps which reduce the 
enjoyment of life. 
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